

Course title: Microeconomics				
Course code: MPE 131		No. of credits: 4	L-T-P: 40-16-0	Learning hours: 56
Pre-requisite course code and title (if any): None. However, knowledge of high school calculus is required to follow most of the topics.				
Department: Department of Policy Studies				
Course coordinator: Dr.Soumendu Sarkar			Course instructor: Guest Faculty	
Contact details: soumendu.sarkar@terisas.ac.in				
Course type: Core			Course offered in: Semester 1	
Course description: Microeconomics is the study of decision-making at the level of the individual or the firm and how it relates to market behaviour. It begins with study of decision-making when markets are competitive, i.e., when individuals cannot influence the market price and there is no information asymmetry. We show that rational decision-making in competitive markets lead to efficient outcomes. Subsequently, we show that markets are no longer efficient when the assumption of competition is withdrawn. We consider three such deviations from competitive markets, viz., monopolistic behaviour, strategic behaviour and asymmetric information, leaving the analysis of public goods and externalities for courses on environment and natural resources.				
Course objectives: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. To introduce students to models of individual and market behaviour at an advanced level of rigour 2. To familiarise students with mathematical modelling in Microeconomics 3. To emphasize the role of simplifying and critical assumptions in microeconomic modelling 				
Course contents				
Module	Topic	L	T	P
	Group 1			
I	Consumer Behaviour Preference and utility representation; utility maximisation and expenditure minimisation; duality; market demand; consumer's welfare.	6	2	
II	Producer Behaviour Technology and its representations; profit maximisation and cost minimisation; duality; market supply.	2	2	
III	Competitive Market: Partial equilibrium Competitive equilibrium; comparative statics; welfare.	4	2	
IV	Competitive Market: General Equilibrium and Pareto Optimality Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics.	4	2	
V	Uncertainty Expected Utility Theorem, Measures of Risk Aversion; Insurance; General Equilibrium with uncertainty	4	2	
	Group 2			
VI	Monopoly Monopoly pricing; Price Discrimination; durable goods; Coase conjecture; Product differentiation.	4	2	
VII	Strategic Behaviour Representation of games; Dominant Strategy; Nash Equilibrium; subgame perfection; repeated games; Applications: Cournot, Bertrand, Stackelberg leadership, Entry deterrence, Rubinstein bargaining.	6	2	
	Group 3			
VIII	Information and Games of Incomplete Information Information Asymmetry and the "Lemons" problem; Adverse selection; Moral Hazard; Games of Incomplete Information and Bayes-Nash equilibrium; Basic Theory of Auctions; Myerson optimal auction; Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information and Perfect Bayesian equilibrium; Spence job market signalling.	8	2	
VIII	Markets as Institutions Transaction cost approach: Coase and Williamson	2		
	Total	40	16	
Evaluation criteria:				

<p>Test 1: Homework Assignment: 20%</p> <p>Test 2: Written Examination : Group 1 40%;</p> <p>Test 3: Written Examination : Group 2: 20%;</p> <p>Test 4: Written Examination : Group 3: 20%</p>
<p>Learning outcomes: At the end of this course, students will be able to</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Understand standard theoretical models of individual and market behaviour at a rigorous level [Tests 1-2] 2. Mathematically formulate key microeconomic problems and salient variations [Tests 1, 3, 4] 3. Critically appreciate microeconomic assumptions and their limitations [Tests 2-4]
<p>Pedagogical approach: Classroom teaching; interactive sessions; tutorials for problem solving.</p>
<p>Materials: Required Texts:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Mas-Colell, A., Whinston, M.D. and Green, J.R., 1995. <i>Microeconomic theory</i>. New York: Oxford university press. 2. Jehle, G.A. and P.J. Reny, 2011. <i>Advanced Microeconomic Theory</i> (3rd Edition), Prentice Hall. 3. Tirole, J., 1988. <i>The theory of industrial organization</i>. MIT press. 4. Gibbons, R., 1992. <i>Game theory for applied economists</i>. Princeton University Press. 5. Salanié, B., 2005. <i>The economics of contracts: a primer</i>. MIT press. <p>Required papers:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Coase, R.H., 1960. The problem of social cost. <i>The journal of Law and Economics</i>, 3(1), pp.1-40. 2. Coase, R.H., 1937. The nature of the firm. <i>Economica</i>, 4(16), pp.386-405. 3. Williamson, O.E., 2000. The new institutional economics: taking stock, looking ahead. <i>Journal of Economic Literature</i>, 38(3), pp.595-613.
<p>Additional information : Lecture notes and problem sets will be provided.</p>
<p>Student responsibilities: Attendance, feedback, discipline: as per university rules.</p>

Course reviewers:

1. Krishnendu Ghosh Dastidar, Professor, Centre for Economic Studies and Planning, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
2. Manipushpak Mitra, Professor, Economic Research Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata.